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Abstract
The involvement of the private sector in the Farm Input Subsidy Programme (FISP) has changed over the lifetime 
of the programme with increasing participation in fertilizer procurement, inclusion and exclusion in fertiliser retail 
sales, increased participation in seed sales and increased participation in the transportation of fertilisers to various 
outlets in Malawi. This paper documents changes in private sector involvement in various aspects of the programme 
since 2005/06 and identifies benefits and challenges of participation of the private sector in the implementation 
of the programme. The paper reviews the experience of private sector participation using data from the Logistics 
Unit and household and community surveys conducted in the 2006/07, 2008/09 and 2010/11 agricultural seasons. 
The analysis shows that commercial sales of fertilisers, although lower than the pre-subsidy levels, have been 
increasing suggesting that the programme has in the medium term stimulated demand for fertilisers in Malawi. 
This has occurred at a time when the private sector has increasingly participated in the procurement of subsidy 
fertiliser but has been excluded from retailing of subsidy fertilisers. The seed component of the subsidy programme, 
which has always involved the private sector, has attracted additional seed growers and expanded the number of 
varieties for maize seeds and legumes.
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1.0 Introduction
The implementation of the Farm Input Subsidy 
Programme (FISP) in Malawi since the 2005/06 agricultural 
season has involved the interaction of the Government 
of Malawi, the private sector, the development partners, 
Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), non-governmental 
organisations, traditional leaders and smallholder 
farmers. These have played various roles in the 
implementation and success of the programme. The 
private sector has played a critical role in the procurement 
of fertilisers, the transportation of fertilisers to various 
markets, the retail sale of fertilisers, and the production 
and sale of improved seeds.
There are benefits for the inclusion of the private sector 
in the implementation of a large and nation-wide 
agricultural input subsidy programme, as noted in 
Imperial College et al. (2007). First, it is believed that most 
of the activities can be done more efficiently by the 
private sector, which is less prone to the bureaucracy 
associated with state delivery of services. Secondly, the 
involvement of the private sector is seen as a strategy 
for developing the private market system, especially in 
remote areas where the incentives for private sector 
investment in markets are weak. Thirdly, the involvement 
of the private sector allows the Government to use scarce 
resources on other activities, by reducing the cost of the 
subsidy to government. Fourthly, the participation of 
the private sector in input retailing reduces the 
displacement of commercial sales by subsidised inputs.
The paper is organized into five sections. The next 
section reviews the nature of private sector participation 
in the input subsidy programme in the fertiliser and seed 
components of the programme. Section 3 documents 
the experiences of private sector participation in the 
subsidy programme between the 2006/07 and 2011/12 
agricultural seasons. We highlight the nature, extent and 
trends of participation in various aspects of the 
programme using national level data, community and 
household survey data (conducted in 2006/07, 2008/09 
and 2010/11 agricultural seasons) and data from the 
Logistics Unit. Section 4 highlights the challenges and 
opportunities for greater private sector participation in 
the implementation of the subsidy programme. In 
section 5, we conclude and highlight the issues and 
options for improving private sector participation in the 
implementation of the subsidy programme.
2.0 Nature of Private Sector 
Participation in Subsidy 
Programme
The private sector participates in the subsidy 
programme in various ways in the fertiliser and seeds 
components of the programme. On one hand, the relative 
roles of the private sector in the fertiliser component of 
the programme have varied over time as regards their 
participation in and exclusion from retail sales while 
remaining important partners in the procurement of 
fertilisers for the programme and commercial sales. On 
the other hand, private sector participation in the seed 
component of the programme has been consistent. Apart 
from participation in the subsidy programme, the private 
sector also procures fertilisers for commercial sales in 
various market outlets across the country.
2.1 Fertiliser markets
2.1.1 Procurement of fertilisers
School of Oriental and African Studies et al. (2008) 
categorise the private firms involved in procurement of 
fertilisers into large/well established and small/new 
entrants, which are members of the Fertiliser Association 
of Malawi. The private sector firms participate in the 
procurement of fertilisers for the programme in a 
competitive tendering process. In addition, two state-
owned enterprises, the Agricultural Development and 
Marketing Corporation (ADMARC) and Smallholder 
Farmers Fertiliser Revolving Fund of Malawi (SFFRFM), 
also take part in the fertiliser tendering process. Over 
time, the business opportunities in the supply of fertilisers 
to the programme have led to new entrants in the 
importation of fertilisers. Dorward et al. (2010) note that 
there has been increased participation of the private 
sector in the supply of fertilisers to the programme, in 
terms of number of players and the relative volume 
handled by the private sector relative to volumes handled 
by the state-owned enterprises or parastatals. Most 
importantly, private sector participation in the 
procurement of fertilisers has been consistent since the 
programme started in 2005/06. There has been growing 
interest in the supply of fertilisers to the programme. 
Logistics Unit (2012) shows that in the 2011/12 season, 
65 enterprises submitted bids to supply fertilisers to the 
subsidy programme of which 20 were awarded contracts, 
an increase from 11 companies in 2007/08 season 
(Logistics Unit 2008).
2.1.2  Distribution and transportation 
of fertilisers
The other important role played by the private sector 
in the implementation of the subsidy programme is the 
transportation of fertilisers from the national depots to 
the retail outlets in various parts of the country. There is 
no participation of state-owned enterprises in this 
activity, and this service is purely provided by private 
transporters through competitive bidding. The 
transporters of fertilisers from depots to unit markets 
are selected by the Ministry of Agriculture through a 
bidding process (Logistics Unit 2008). In the 2011/12 
season, a total of 23 transporters participated in the 
distribution of fertilisers from SFFRFM depots to various 
unit markets across the country (Logistics Unit 2012) 
compared to 16 transporters in 2008/09 season (Logistics 
Unit 2009).
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2.1.3  Retailing of fertilisers
Smallholder farmers redeem their FISP coupons at 
various retail markets across the country. Although the 
private sector plays a dominant role in the procurement 
of fertilisers, its participation in fertiliser retailing to 
smallholder farmers under the subsidy programme has 
varied, with the private sector participating in the 
2006/07 and 2007/08 agricultural seasons only (Dorward 
and Chirwa 2011). In these two seasons, smallholder 
farmers were able to redeem fertiliser coupons at some 
of the major retailers of fertilisers, but independent agro-
dealer sellers were excluded in the redemption of 
fertiliser coupons. Otherwise, ADMARC and SFFRFM have 
been the market outlets through which smallholder 
farmers have redeemed their subsidy fertiliser coupons.
2.2 Seeds markets
The private sector has been a major player at various 
stages in the implementation of the seeds component 
of the subsidy programme. Its inclusion in implementation, 
in terms of both procurement and retailing of seeds, has 
been consistent since the commencement of the 
programme in 2005/06 and since the 2006/07 season 
with the inclusion of the small-scale agro-dealers in the 
redemption of seed coupons (Dorward and Chirwa 2011). 
The seed industry comprises the growers and retailers. 
The growers form the Seed Trade Association of Malawi 
(STAM) and are classified by ownership into international 
firms and domestic firms. There are six seed growers in 
Malawi, all of which participate in the subsidy programme. 
The international firms include Pioneer and Monsanto 
who specialise in hybrid maize, and Pannar and Seed Co 
specialising in both hybrids and open pollinated varieties 
(OPV). The domestic firms specialize in OPVs and legume 
seeds and include Funwe, Demeter and Association of 
Smallholder Seed Multiplication Group (ASSMAG). The 
retail sector of the seed industry consists of seed growers’ 
distributor outlets, agro-dealers, cooperatives, 
supermarkets and parastatals (ADMARC and SFFRFM). 
2.2.1 Seed production and 
wholesaling
Seeds for the subsidy programme are supplied by the 
private international and domestic firms, but there have 
also been changes in the supply of seeds to the 
programme. Initially, the private companies were 
awarded contracts to supply seeds to the programme 
and these contracts were awarded to both large 
international and small-scale domestic firms including 
smallholder seed multiplication groups to supply hybrid 
and OPV maize seeds and legumes to the programme. 
In the 2007/08 season, six growers of seeds participated 
in the supply of seeds to the subsidy programme with 
one specializing in hybrid seeds, two in both hybrids and 
OPV, and three specializing in OPV seeds.
2.2.2 Retailing of seeds
As noted above, there has been limited variation in 
the participation of the private sector in the retailing of 
subsidised seeds under the subsidy programme. The 
delivery of the seed component of the programme has 
been consistent with the promotion of private sector 
development in input markets. In 2005/06 season, all 
the distribution and retailing of seeds under the subsidy 
programme was done through ADMARC and SFFRFM 
(Imperial College et al. 2007). However, since the 2006/07 
season, seed procurement has been handled purely by 
the private sector, and seed suppliers have been 
distributing the seeds to retailers (parastatal and private 
sector retailers) across the country. Logistics Unit (2008) 
notes that maize seed dealer outlets were unrestricted 
and seed producers entered into various arrangements 
with small scale input agro-dealers and retail chain stores 
in addition to ADMARC and SFFRFM outlets.
3.0 Experiences of Private 
Sector Participation from 
2006/07 – 2011/12
The analysis of the role of the private sector in the 
implementation of the subsidy programme is based on 
a review of reports by the Logistics Unit (2006 – 2012) 
and the analysis of survey data collected from smallholder 
farmers and communities for the 2006/07, 2008/09 and 
2010/11 agricultural seasons.
3.1 Fertiliser
3.1.1 Procurement
Figure 1 presents the trend in private sector 
participation in the procurement of fertilisers under the 
subsidy programme. There are two parastatals involved 
in the procurement of fertilisers, ADMARC and SFFRFM, 
but only SFFRFM has been active in the bidding while 
ADMARC has benefited from uncompetitive allocation 
as a parastatal except in 2011/12 where it also appears 
as a bidder. There are increasing trends in both the 
number of private sector bidders interested in procuring 
fertilisers and the number of bidders who were awarded 
contracts to supply subsidy programme fertilisers, 
particularly from the 2009/10 season. The number of 
interested private bidders increases from 24 companies 
in 2009/10 to 65 companies in 2011/12. The subsidy 
programme has over time attracted new companies 
whose traditional business is not importation of 
agricultural inputs. Similarly, the number of successful 
awards of contracts has also increased from 10 private 
companies in 2009/10 to 20 private companies in 
2011/12. With respect to parastatals, SFFRFM has always 
participated and succeeded in the supply of subsidy 
fertilisers while ADMARC has only been awarded 
contracts to supply in 2009/10 and 2011/12 agricultural 
seasons.
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Apart from the entry of other players in the supply of 
fertilisers under the programme, there have also been 
notable exits such as the National Association of 
Smallholder Farmers of Malawi (NASFAM), Rab Processors 
and Yara who participated in 2006/07 but have since not 
continued to participate in the programme (Kelly et al. 
2010). Yara closed down its international representation 
in Malawi, turning over an exclusive right to import Yara 
fertilisers to Agricultural Resources Limited.
Figure 2 shows the share of fertilisers supplied to the 
programme by the private firms and parastatals in terms 
of volume and value of supplies. Panel (a) shows steady 
increase in the volume accounted for by the private sector 
between 2007/08 and 2010/11 rising from 70 percent 
to 95 percent. However, in 2011/12 the private sector 
share fell to 71 percent. In panel (b), there is a similar 
trend in the share of the value of supplies accounted by 
the private sector, increasing from 71 percent in 2008/09 
to 95 percent in 2010/11 and falling to 78 percent in 
2011/12. In monetary terms, the highest realised value 
to the private sector occurred in 2008/09 amounting to 
$203.75 million, consistent with the high volume 
procured by the private sector but also reflecting high 
international fertiliser prices.
The private companies also continued to procure 
fertilisers for commercial sales. However, due to difficulties 
in obtaining commercial sales data from the private 
sector, we use import figures to extrapolate the available 
fertilisers for commercial sales after accounting for 
subsidised fertilisers. The official import data include 
fertilisers for both estates and smallholder farmers. Figure 
3 shows the trends in imports, disaggregated between 
subsidy fertilisers and fertilisers available for commercial 
sales using industry data from 2004 to 2006 (School of 
Oriental and African Studies et al. 2008) and NSO import 
data from 2007. The trend in the fertilisers available 
commercial sales after subtracting the subsidy from 
imports shows a marginal increase between 2004/05 and 
2005/06 season and a sharp decrease in 2006/07.1
After falling in 2005, the trend in fertilisers for 
commercial sales from 2006/07 is increasing availability 
of commercial fertilisers in addition to increases in total 
imports of fertilisers. The available commercial fertilisers 
in 2008/09 are still below the 2004/05 level (the year 
before the commencement of the subsidy programme). 
A small reduction in subsidised fertiliser between 2007/08 
and 2008/09 is associated with a substantial increase in 
the quantity of fertiliser available for commercial sales 
in 2008/09. There is a decline in importation of fertilisers 
and availability of commercial fertilisers in 2009/10 but 
an increase in imports and available commercial fertilisers 
in 2010/11, while the subsidy levels remained unchanged. 
The decline in 2009/10 is also associated with a sharp 
Figure 1. Number of bids and awards in fertiliser procurement, 2008/09 – 2011/12
Figure 2  Share of subsidy fertilisers supplied by sector, 2007/08 – 2011/12
Source: Logistics Unit (2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012)
Note: The figures are new procurement during the season.
Source: Logistics Unit (2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012)
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decline in the price of burley tobacco. Chirwa (2011) notes 
that 2008/09 prices for burley were significantly low 
towards the end of the marketing season compared to 
three previous seasons. This might have led to reduced 
demand for commercial fertilisers.
Interestingly, available commercial fertiliser in 2010/11 
was more than subsidised fertiliser. The subsidy 
programme in the 2010/11 season excluded tobacco 
fertilisers, and the increase in the available commercial 
fertilisers may reflect lower displacement due to the focus 
of the programme on maize fertilisers. As noted in School 
of Oriental and African Studies et al. (2008), the subsidy 
on tobacco fertilisers had higher displacement than the 
subsidy on maize fertilisers. Then, in 2011/12 there is 
another drop in imports, subsidised fertilisers and 
available commercial fertilisers. Tobacco was also 
excluded in 2011/12 but the decline in available 
commercial fertiliser may be partly due to the collapse 
of tobacco prices in 2010/11 season which has led many 
smallholder farmers to abandon tobacco production in 
the 2011/12 season. The 2011/12 crop estimates show 
that tobacco production is expected to decline by more 
than 36 percent. Except for bad years for tobacco, these 
results show that there has been overall increase in 
fertiliser importation and increase in the fertilisers 
available for commercial use, suggesting that after an 
initial decline the subsidy programme might have 
stimulated fertiliser use.
3.1.2  Fertiliser retail
There are several players in the fertiliser retail market 
including importer-managed outlets, cooperative-
managed outlets, chain stores and supermarkets, agro-
dealers and parastatals’ retail markets (Kelly et al. 2010). 
The participation of the private sector in the retail 
marketing of subsidised fertilisers has been the most 
difficult aspect in relation to the development of the 
private input markets across the country. As noted above, 
the private sector has been allowed to redeem fertiliser 
vouchers only in 2006/07 and 2007/08 seasons. Those 
in favour of private sector participation in fertiliser 
subsidy retail sales point to several benefits including 
efficiency, freeing government resources, facilitating a 
strategy for promoting input markets in remote areas, 
broadening of choice of outlets for smallholder farmers, 
and reducing transaction costs and cost of queuing. 
However, opponents of private sector participation in 
subsidy fertiliser retail marketing argue that the private 
sector cannot be trusted as they may be exchanging 
coupons with other merchandise rather than fertilisers 
in the absence of an audit system, the available stocks 
by the private sector firms cannot be verified, high 
incidence of fraud and that it will be difficult to control 
the cost of the subsidy programme.
In the 2006/07 season, a total of 174,688 metric tonnes 
of subsidised fertilisers were sold to smallholder farmers 
with ADMARC and SFFRFM sales accounting for 72 
percent of fertiliser sales and the private retailers 
accounting for 28 percent (School of Oriental and African 
Figure 3 Fertilisers imports and fertiliser use, 2004/05 – 2011/12
Source: National Statistical Office (2009) – Statistical Year Book Data Set; Dorward and Chirwa (2011) and School of Oriental and African Studies et al. 
(2008).
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Studies et al. 2008). The private sector continued to 
participate in retail of subsidised fertilisers in 2007/08 
with the innovation of a remote market premium. 
According to Logistics Unit (2008), ‘in certain extension 
planning areas (EPAs) within the districts where private 
sector involvement had been limited in the previous year, 
it was agreed to pay the retailers an additional sum of 
either MK 100 or MK 200 per voucher based on last year’s 
sales figures for each EPA’. Kelly et al. (2010) find that the 
‘remoteness’ premium encouraged the private sector to 
provides inputs in more locations in 2007/08 than in the 
previous season, although there was no evidence that 
such outreach was on a medium to long term basis.
Figure 4 shows the various retail channels from which 
households reported purchasing their commercial 
fertilisers in the 2006/07, 2008/09 and 2010/11 seasons. 
The proportion of households accessing private company 
market outlets for commercial purchases has increased 
significantly from about 6 percent in 2006/07 season to 
about 30 percent in 2010/11. This increasing trend is also 
evident in the use of clubs or farmer cooperatives as a 
source of commercial fertilisers. The purchase of fertilisers 
on a commercial basis from parastatals has been falling, 
from 18 percent in 2006/07 to about 13 percent in the 
2010/11 season. These figures suggest that commercial 
sales of fertilisers have flourished in the presence of the 
subsidy programme. Although the private sector has 
been excluded in the retail of subsidised fertilisers, the 
subsidy programme might have stimulated demand for 
commercial fertilisers, thereby promoting private sector 
development.
The evidence on household use of different marketing 
channels for purchase of commercial fertilisers is also 
supported by the average volumes of commercial 
fertilisers purchased by households in Figure 5. On 
average, the volume purchased from traders has fallen 
significantly from about 50 kilograms in 2006/07 to about 
10 kilograms in 2010/11. Sourcing fertilisers from relatives 
or neighbours increased, but this may be fertilisers that 
could either have been subsidised and resold or received 
through remittances. There is an increase in average 
volumes purchased from the local market initially, but 
this declined between 2008/09 and 2010/11. There is a 
declining trend, however, in average commercial 
purchases from parastatals (ADMARC and SFFRFM). The 
increasing trends in the volume purchased from farmer 
cooperatives and private company outlets suggest 
positive private sector market development. For instance, 
in the 2006/07 season, households purchased on average 
9 kilograms of commercial fertilisers, but this increases 
to 42 kilograms in 2008/09 and 60 kilograms in 2010/11 
despite fertiliser price increases. This further suggests 
that the subsidy programme may have helped in 
stimulating commercial demand for fertilisers, and 
certainly has not depressed them, as private marketing 
activities have continued to flourish in the medium term.
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Figure 4 Sources of commercial fertiliser purchases, 2006/07 – 2010/11
Source: Computed by authors based on AISS1, AISS2 and AISS3.
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Interestingly, although the international fertiliser 
prices almost tripled in the 2008/09 season (Dorward 
and Chirwa 2011), there was an increase in the purchase 
of commercial fertilisers from private company retail 
shops. This is also consistent with the lower estimated 
displacement in 2008/09 season (Ricker-Gilbert and 
Jayne 2010). Similarly, Chirwa et al. (2011), using a 
matched panel, note general increases in the purchase 
of commercial fertilisers between 2008/09 and 2010/11 
among poor and non-poor households and a decrease 
in average subsidy fertilisers received by households.
These positive changes in private sector market 
development are also consistent with earlier studies. For 
example, Kelly et al. (2010) note that the perceived 
number of retailers selling only fertilisers increased while 
those selling both seeds and fertilisers fell between the 
2006/07 and 2008/09 agricultural seasons, although 
community surveys revealed little change in the number 
of input suppliers. Nonetheless, there were also a number 
of exits from seed and fertiliser markets during the period. 
Similarly, a higher proportion of retailers revealed that 
their business performance in terms of sales and profits 
had increased between 2007/08 and 2008/09 (Kelly et 
al. 2010).
3.2 Seeds
The private sector has consistently participated in the 
distribution and retailing of seeds under the subsidy 
programme, as noted above. Improved maize seeds and 
legumes have been made available to the programme 
by the private sector. The retailing of seeds under the 
programme was liberalised since the 2006/07 season. 
This has meant players in the seed value chain, including 
seed producers, agro-dealers and supermarkets, have 
been participating in the subsidy programme. Previous 
evaluation reports such as School of Oriental and African 
Studies et al. (2008) and Kelly et al. (2010) have pointed 
to the positive impact of the subsidy programme in 
promoting private sector businesses in input provision.
In terms of the structure of the seed industry, there 
have been some limited changes in the number of seed 
growers, but the major changes in the structure seem 
to have occurred at retail level. Table 1 below provides 
the distribution of firms supplying various seeds to the 
subsidy programme and shows that the number of firms 
supplying seeds has increased from 6 in 2006/07 to 12 
in 2011/12. Two new growers entered into the market 
in 2009/10, Seed Tech supplying maize hybrid and OPV, 
and National Association of Smallholder Farmers of 
Malawi (NASFAM) supplying groundnut seeds (Logistics 
Unit, 2010). In 2010/11 the number of firms supplying 
seeds to the programme increased to 9 with exit of Seed 
Figure 5 Mean quantities of commercial fertiliser purchases, 2006/07 – 2010/11
Source: Computed by authors based on AISS1, AISS2 and AISS3.
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Tech, Agricultural Input Suppliers Association of Malawi 
(AISAM) and ASSMAG and entry of Panthochi supplying 
OVP maize seeds and Peacock supplying tested 
groundnut seeds to the programme (Logistics Unit, 2011). 
In 2011/12, 12 companies supplied seeds to the 
programme including re-entry of AISAM, ASSMAG, Seed 
Tech and a new entry, Pindulani (Logistics Unit, 2012). 
Although the number of firm has increased over the years, 
Kelly et al. (2010) note that this has not resulted in 
competitive pricing as the supply prices to the programme 
are negotiated between STAM and the government. 
However, this competition has just broadened the choice 
of seeds for the farmers.
Nonetheless, the seed industry is highly oligopolistic, 
with new entrants just providing fringe competition. Data 
from Logistics Unit shows that the two largest suppliers 
of seeds to the subsidy programme account for 71 
percent of maize voucher redemption and the three 
largest suppliers account for 87 percent. Similarly, in the 
legume seed market, the two and three largest suppliers 
to the subsidy programme account for 65 percent and 
75 percent of the voucher redemption, respectively.
There is, however, an increase in the level of competition 
at retail level in terms of the number of competitors in 
the local communities. Kelly et al. (2010) find that agro-
dealers had reported a 15 percent increase in competitors 
between 2005/06 and 2008/09 while distributors 
reported a 3 percent increase in the number of 
competitors. However, community surveys revealed that 
only 22 percent of the communities believed that the 
number of seed sellers accessible in their community 
had increased while 57 percent maintained that the 
numbers had remained the same between 2006/07 and 
2008/09 (Kelly et al. 2010).
Under the subsidy programme, smallholder farmers 
are provided with maize seed vouchers and flexible 
vouchers that they can use to purchase legume seeds. 
In 2007/08 and 2008/09, flexible vouchers were also 
allowed for maize seed redemption, but they have been 
restricted to legumes since the 2009/10 season. Table 2 
presents the size of the seed component of the subsidy 
programme which provides indicators of private sector 
participation in the seed component of the subsidy 
programme. In terms of coupons redeemed, maize is the 
main component and when flexible vouchers were also 
accepted for maize seeds a high proportion of flexible 
vouchers were also redeemed for maize seeds. One 
reason for this was the problem of availability of legume 
seeds in the earlier seasons of the programme (School 
of Oriental and African Studies et al. 2008).
On average, the programme has distributed to 
smallholder farmers 5,840 metric tons of hybrid maize 
seeds, 1,837 metric tons of OPV maize seeds and 2,256 
metric tons of legume seeds per year. There has been a 
steady increase in hybrid seeds obtained by smallholder 
farmers since 2007/08 until a fall in 2011/12. OPV maize 
seeds dropped substantially in 2008/09 but then 
increased steadily from the 2009/10 season. In terms of 
the costs, consequently the private sector business 
promoted directly by the subsidy amounted on average 
to US$19.1 million per year in the past five agricultural 
seasons. Figure 6 shows the distribution of maize seeds 
by volume and costs. Hybrid maize seeds are the most 
dominant seed type redeemed by vouchers among 
smallholder farmers. Interestingly, after an initial drop 
in the share of OPV maize seeds, in the past 2 season 
there is increased demand for OPV maize seeds. In 
2009/10, OPV maize seeds accounted for 11.9 percent 
of maize seeds, but the share rose to 31.7 percent in 
2011/12 while hybrid maize accounted for 89.1 percent 
and 68.3 percent, respectively.
With respect to the relative cost of maize seeds and 
legume seeds (Figure 6(b)), there is an increasing share 
of legumes in the cost of the seed supplies obtained by 
smallholder farmers from the subsidy programme. With 
the increase in the number of seed growers providing 
legume seeds in the programme, the trend reflects 
substantial improvements in the availability of legume 
seeds in the market under the programme, such that 
legumes accounted for nearly 30 percent of the seed 
component in the 2011/12 season compared to only 5 
percent in the 2008/09 season.
Table 1 Number of seed suppliers to the subsidy programme, 2006/07 – 2011/12
Type of Seeds 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12
Hybrid Maize Seed 3 3 3 4 3 5
OPV Maize Seed 5 5 4 4 4 6
Tested Bean Seed - - - 4 2 5
Tested Groundnut Seed - - - 4 4 10
Soya Bean Seed - - - 2 2 3
Pigeon Pea Seed - - - 1 1 5
Cow Peas Seed - - - 1 1 1
Cotton Seed - - 2 - - -
Number of Firms 6 6 8 8 9 12
Note: Some of the firms are supplying more than one type of seeds, so the total number of firms is not the total for the columns.
Source: Logistics Unit (2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012)
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The role of the private sector in the marketing of seeds 
can be deduced from household survey data obtained 
in 2006/07, 2008/09 and 2010/11 seasons. Figure 7 shows 
the use of various market channels to access improved 
maize seeds (hybrid and OVP) by households in the 
survey years. The parastatals, ADMARC and SFFRFM, are 
the main retail markets from which smallholder farmers 
obtained their improved seeds, with about 70 percent 
of farmers utilising these retail outlets. With respect to 
private outlets, use of private companies by households 
to obtain improved seeds has been increasing from 10 
percent of households in 2006/07 to 17 percent in 
2010/11. There is also increasing use of relatives or 
neighbours as a source of improved seeds from 4 percent 
of households in 2006/07 to 13 percent in 2010/11. These 
sales through relatives or neighbour could be recycled 
seeds or remittance seeds offered for resale or subsidy 
seeds offered for resale.
With respect to quantities of seeds bought 
commercially or using the seed subsidy vouchers, Figure 
8(a) shows an average decline per household of 
commercial purchase and an increase in subsidy purchase 
between 2008/09 and 2010/11. The 2010/11 figure also 
reflects the increase in the number of seed coupons 
provided under the programme compared to 2008/09 
season. Farmers are also purchasing more hybrid maize 
seeds both commercially and under the subsidy 
programme compared to OPV maize seeds. While 
commercial purchases of OPV maize seeds have remained 
the same, for hybrid maize seeds commercial purchases 
declined from an average of 2.1 kilograms in 2008/09 to 
1.6 kilograms in 2010/11 per household. In both cases 
of hybrid and OPV maize seeds, there is an increase in 
subsidy redemption. These declining trends suggest that 
the subsidy programme is crowding out commercial 
purchases, although the use of improved seeds has been 
increasing.
With respect to private market participation between 
2008/09 and 2010/11, Figure 8(b) shows that there was 
a substantial decline in average purchases of commercial 
seeds but a substantial increase in subsidised seeds 
purchases by households. Similarly, average commercial 
purchases of hybrid maize seeds fell but average 
subsidised purchases of hybrid maize seeds increased. 
In contrast, average purchases of commercial seeds from 
state marketing outlets marginally declined between 
2008/09 and 2010/11 and subsidised purchases 
marginally improved. Hybrid maize seeds purchases from 
state marketing outlets, however, fell although subsidised 
purchases increased. Although the proportion of 
Table 2 Size of the seed component of the subsidy programme, 2007/08 – 2011/12
Variable 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12
Coupons Redeemed (N)
Maize Coupons
Flexi Coupons – Maize
Flexi Coupons - Legumes
1,603,302
518,264
142,043
1,561,329
929,382
87,228
1,614,070
-
1,142,738
1,988,066
-
1,310,420
1,376,216
-
1,245,172
Seeds Distributed (MT)
Hybrid Maize Seeds
OPV Maize Seeds
Legume Seeds
2,944 
 2,597 
-
4,532 
 833 
-
7,619 
 1,033 
 1,551
8,521 
 2,129 
 2,727
5,586 
 2,591 
 2,490
Cost of Seeds ($ millions)
Maize Seeds
Legume Seeds
8.18 
 0.99
11.94 
 0.63
17.171
2.837
23.237
7.147
16.487
6.734
Source: Computed based on Logistics Unit (2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012)
Source: Logistics Unit (2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012)
Figure 6 Distribution of maize seeds and seed cost, 2007/08 – 2011/12
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households accessing the private market system is small, 
as observed above, the average purchases of seeds from 
the private market outlets are higher than average 
purchases from parastatal outlets.
Agro-dealers have played an important role in 
facilitating access to inputs in rural areas. Chinsinga 
(2011) notes that with FISP there has been an increase 
in the number of seasonal agro-dealers, a situation that 
has been supported by the practice of seed companies 
who collect the unsold inventories from contracted agro-
dealers during the off-peak FISP period.
4.0 Challenges and 
Opportunities of Private 
Sector Participation
We have examined above the pros and cons of private 
sector involvement in the implementation of the subsidy 
program and discussed its consistent participation at 
procurement and retail level in the seed sector, and in 
procurement of fertilisers, but its exclusion in the retailing 
of subsidised fertilisers. Nonetheless, the involvement 
of the private sector poses challenges but also provides 
opportunities for achieving multiple development 
objectives and improving efficiency in the implementation 
of the programme. This section documents some of the 
challenges experienced with private sector participation 
and the opportunities that exist to improve 
implementation of the programme.
Figure 7 Households’ access to improved maize seeds by retailer, 2006/07 – 2010/11
Figure 8 Volumes of seeds purchased by households, 2008/09 and 2010/11
Source: Computed by authors based on AISS1, AISS2 and AISS3.
Source: Computed by authors based on AISS2 and AISS3.
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4.1 Challenges
4.1.1 Delays in tender awards
The awarding of tenders, particularly for supply of 
fertilisers to the programme, has been one of the 
challenges of private sector participation. The longer the 
time it takes between submission of tenders and the 
awards of tenders the more likely prices are bound to 
change and this can lead to protracted negotiation about 
supply prices for fertilisers. There have been cases in 
which companies awarded tenders have been unable 
to supply at the tender prices due to increased costs of 
supply. However, there is evidence that this has improved 
over time. Kelly et al. (2010) note that most stakeholders 
in 2008/09 were of the view that the announcement of 
tenders improved but the tenders were awarded late. 
Dorward et al. (2010) argue that the delays in award of 
tenders increased private sector risks as both the prices 
of fertilisers and fuel had risen dramatically in the period 
between June 2006/07 and June 2008/09. However, there 
have been improvements in the timing of announcement 
of tender awards more recently (Dorward and Chirwa 
2011).
4.1.2  Trust and monitoring systems
There is often a problem of trust between the private 
sector and the Government that has contributed to the 
continued exclusion of the private sector in the retailing 
of subsidised fertilisers. The lack of trust emerges from 
both sides. From the Government side, there are some 
in Government who believe that the private sector firms 
with their profit motive are likely to exploit their 
engagement to the detriment of smallholder farmers 
and public welfare. Chinsinga (2011) documents some 
of the profit and quick gain motives of some of the agro-
dealers in input supply markets. There have been 
allegations, based on anecdotal incidents reported in 
the media but not substantiated, that some private sector 
retailers were accepting coupons in exchange for 
non-fertiliser items. This reinforced views of sceptics of 
the private sector that the private sector was therefore 
not able to self-regulate its behaviour in the programme.
Others have also argued that when the private sector 
was involved in retailing of subsidised fertilisers, there 
was high incidence of ‘tips or bribes’ paid by farmers. 
However, Kelly et al. (2010) find that the incidence of tips 
and malpractices were higher in parastatals than in 
private sector retails, although the differences were not 
statistically significant, and the incidents of accepted fake 
vouchers were higher in parastatals outlets. Furthermore, 
even with exclusion of the private sector in subsidised 
fertiliser retailing, smallholder farmers still report 
increased incidence of tips from ADMARC and SFFRFM 
outlets (Dorward et al. 2010; Dorward and Chirwa 2011). 
The mistrust of the private sector is also exacerbated by 
the absence of an audit system on the stocks movement 
of inputs as a way of detecting malpractices.
From the private sector’s point of view, Government’s 
inconsistent decisions on private sector participation in 
retail of subsidised fertilisers and delays in making 
inclusion or exclusion decisions characterize policy 
instability, creating uncertainty for private input market 
development. This was particularly the case in 2008/09 
when a decision was made about private sector 
involvement and contracts for inclusion provided, but 
Government reversed the decision without prior notice 
(Kelly et al. 2010). By the time Government made the 
decision to exclude the private sector, the private 
companies had already stocked their retail shops in 
readiness for redemption of vouchers.
4.1.3  Vested interests and 
non-compliance
The subsidy programme has attracted new entrants 
that were hitherto not interested in the fertiliser business, 
particularly from domestic companies, some just created 
to bid for contracts to supply fertilisers to the programme 
(Holden and Tostensen 2011). Some of these companies 
were highly connected to the political establishment, 
but when awarded contracts they had difficulties in 
fulfilling their deliveries. For non-established agricultural 
input suppliers, their main interest is the short-term gains 
from participation in the programme rather that the 
medium to long-term development of the input supply 
market. Chinsinga (2012) notes that most of the contracts 
in the provision of transport services were awarded to 
companies politically linked to the ruling party. Logistics 
Unit (2012) notes that although it became clear that some 
of the suppliers were unlikely to supply the Government 
continued to grant extensions and the final deliveries 
occurred in February 2012 instead of end October 2011. 
The existence of vested interests can be partly attributed 
as one of the reason for non-compliance with the terms 
of the fertiliser supply. Although there have been 
improvements in the timing of deliveries, late deliveries 
were evident and this problem is attributed to the lack 
of penalty clauses in the contracts (Dorward et al. 2010; 
Dorward and Chirwa 2011; Logistics Unit 2011).
4.1.4  Collusion and uniform prices
One of the challenges in the seed component of the 
subsidy programme is the collusive behaviour of seed 
suppliers in deciding the supply price of seeds offered 
to the subsidy programme. Although the subsidy 
programme has attracted a number of players in seed 
production and supply, the pricing arrangement is 
tantamount to collusive pricing due to the desire by 
Government to have a uniform top-up for farmers (Kelly 
et al. 2010). There is no competitive tendering in the seed 
supply to the subsidy programme, in contrast to the 
fertiliser supply system. However, in subsequent years, 
allowance of variable top-up benefited some smallholder 
farmers. In 2010/11, seed companies were allowed to 
apply a discretionary maximum top-up of MK100 per 
maize seed voucher which had the same redemption 
value of MK1650 from the Government, and hybrid seeds 
providers applied the maximum top-up while only one 
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OVP provider maintained the excess (Logistics Unit 2011; 
Logistics Unit 2012).
4.1.5  Inefficient payment system
There is evidence that the payment system by the 
Government for supplies and services rendered to the 
programme by the private sector is inefficient. Logistics 
Unit (2012) report that some of the companies had to 
wait for 6 months to be paid after delivery of fertiliser 
supplies. Similarly, seed companies had outstanding 
invoices for three months in the 2010/11 season (Logistics 
Unit 2012). The Logistics Unit final weekly report for the 
2011/12 programme indicates that Government still 
owed seeds, fertiliser companies and transporters for 
supplies and services provided during the 2010/11 
subsidy programme. These delays in payments are likely 
to lead to high supply prices of inputs and services, as 
suppliers factor in the risk of delayed payments in their 
prices.
4.2 Opportunities
Greater involvement of the private sector in the 
subsidy programme not only promotes private sector 
development in input markets but can also improve 
efficiency in the implementation of the programme. We 
highlight some of the opportunities that exist if the 
challenges noted above can be overcome.
4.2.1  Programme efficiency
The increased involvement of the private sector 
provides the opportunity of increasing the efficiency of 
implementation of the programme. This can be achieved 
by increasing the number of outlets from which 
smallholder farmers can redeem their input coupons and 
broadening their choice of markets. The increase in the 
competition may consequently improve the quality of 
services at market outlets and reduce the incidence of 
tips at the markets. Kelly et al. (2010) note that although 
the incidence of tips was not significantly different 
between parastatals outlets and private sector outlets, 
smallholder farmers were more likely to ‘never pay tips’ 
in private sector outlets. The increase in the number of 
outlets can also reduce the opportunity cost of queuing 
– a phenomenon that has been evident in the programme.
4.2.2  Private sector investment in 
rural input markets
The involvement of the private sector can also 
encourage private investments in rural input markets. 
This requires consistency and transparency in 
Government decisions. Such confidence building may 
bring about investments in rural markets. There are also 
opportunities for designing future private sector 
participation on the basis of performance based 
indicators, such as verifiable expansion of retail outlet 
coverage. Alternatively, the private sector could be 
bidding to supply specific quantities of subsidised 
fertiliser in identified underserved areas identified by 
the Government. These areas can be served directly by 
the private companies or through private company’s 
sub-contraction to agro-dealers. As the analysis above 
has shown, private sales of fertilisers have flourished 
suggesting increased demand for fertilisers, but it is not 
clear whether this has also facilitated the expansion of 
the private sector into poorly served areas. Such 
performance rewards and increased demand for fertilisers 
can provide incentives to the private sector to invest in 
more input market infrastructure on permanent basis 
or seasonal basis.
4.2.3 Storage facilities
The other area in which the subsidy can exploit 
opportunities of private sector involvement is storage 
facilities. With the exclusion of the private sector in 
fertiliser retail, all the programme fertilisers have to be 
delivered at the SFFRFM depots for uplifting to markets. 
The exclusion of the private sector has created pressure 
on storage facilities at the depots and parastatals unit 
markets. This has introduced inefficiencies and 
heightened the incidence of stock outs in unit markets. 
Logistics Unit (2012) notes that the shortage of storage 
space in markets in the critical early months of the 
programme in 2011/12 meant that only 39 percent of 
the 63 percent available fertilisers was uplifted to unit 
markets. Furthermore, the limited storage capacity of 
SFFRFM depots in the past four years of private sector 
exclusion have led to congestion (Logistics Unit 2011; 
Logistics Unit 2012), a situation that can be alleviated by 
more involvement of the private sector in retail markets.
4.2.4  Other opportunities
Other opportunities that can facilitate the participation 
of the private sector in input market development and 
benefit programme impact from private sector 
participation are targeting of beneficiaries, timing of 
coupon distribution and use of electronic vouchers. First, 
better methods of targeting can reduce displacement 
and therefore increase demand for commercial purchases. 
Dorward and Chirwa (2012) discuss some of the targeting 
options that have the potential to reduce displacements 
and the practical difficulties associated with various 
targeting approaches. Secondly, improvements in the 
timing of coupon distribution, by distributing earlier, can 
help farmers to plan for commercial purchases and 
thereby help commercial sales. Earlier distribution of 
coupons can bolster input sales as those that do not 
receive coupons and those that receive coupons but want 
to top-up would be certain about the commercial 
purchases. In this case involvement of the private sector 
could also offer opportunities for earlier purchase of 
inputs by farmers and hence more effective yield gains. 
Thirdly, there are also opportunities that may arise with 
the use of electronic vouchers which could enable the 
private sector to invest in electronic systems resulting 
in shared costs, benefiting both government and private 
suppliers. 
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5.0 Conclusions
This paper set out to review the participation of the 
private sector in the implementation of FISP between 
the 2006/07 season and 2011/12 season. We have utilized 
information from final implementation reports of the 
Logistics Unit and survey data collected in 2006/07, 
2008/09 and 2010/11 seasons. We have noted that while 
the private sector has participated consistently in the 
subsidy programme since 2006/07, its participation in 
the fertiliser market – particularly retail marketing – has 
been limited. In the fertiliser market, the private sector 
continues to play an increasing role in the importation 
and procurement of fertiliser for the subsidy programme, 
but has only been allowed to retail subsidised fertilisers 
in 2006/07 and 2007/08 seasons. During the period the 
private sector participated in the programme, agro-
dealers were excluded in the marketing of subsidised 
fertiliser. Otherwise, the retailing of subsidised fertilisers 
has been monopolized by parastatals, ADMARC and 
SFFRFM. In the seed sector, various players in the seed 
value chain including agro-dealers have been allowed 
to participate in seed production and retailing of 
subsidised improved maize seeds and legumes.
The main conclusion of this study is that although the 
subsidy has some negative impacts on private sector 
development in form of displacement in the short-run, 
in the medium to long term it appears to have been 
catalytic in raising the demand for fertilisers and improved 
seeds. The private sector in the fertiliser markets is 
increasingly the main supplier of fertilisers to the 
programme, and their exclusion from the retail market 
for subsidised fertilisers has not dampened demand for 
commercial fertilisers in the medium term. In the seeds 
market, the increase in the seed subsidy from 2009/10 
seems to be crowding out commercial sales. However, 
like the fertiliser market, in the medium to long-term the 
massive seed subsidy may stimulate demand for 
improved seeds as farmers witness the benefits of 
technology adoption.
In addition, in both the fertiliser and seed markets, 
there is an increase in the number of private sector 
players, although exits especially in the fertiliser market 
are evident. However, the challenge is to translate the 
increase in competition into reasonably priced inputs 
and quality of services offered to smallholder farmers in 
underserved areas.
There are benefits for expanding the role of the private 
sector in reducing programme costs, increasing efficiency 
and alleviating problems of storage capacity in parastatal 
markets, but the involvement of the private sector will 
require mutual trust among stakeholders, systems of 
transparency and accountability and policy consistency 
and credibility. These conditions can create a conducive 
environment for private sector investments in input 
markets. As the demand for commercial fertilisers 
increase, assuming the trend continues, there may be 
scope for gradual reduction in the subsidy programme. 
However, this will require strategic investment in input 
markets by the private sector to sustain such demand. 
While the size of subsidised fertilisers has been 
constant, the growing demand for commercial purchases 
by smallholder farmers should also provide incentives 
for the private sector to strategically position itself by 
expanding their network in underserved areas. This can 
easily be achieved by developing sustainable partnership 
with the agro-dealer network that exists in rural areas. 
There is also scope for increasing private participation 
in the fertiliser retail market through performance based 
contracts to supply underserved areas.
Nonetheless, it is important to continuously monitor 
the impact of the subsidy programme on private sector 
markets and to monitor the integrity and efficiency of 
the private sector. Chirwa et al. (2011) note that improving 
the efficiency and competitiveness of input suppliers is 
one of the conditions that can facilitate graduation from 
the subsidy programme at household, area and national 
levels. In particular, tracking the effects on commercial 
sales from smallholder farmers and input markets 
through periodic surveys should generate useful 
information for evidence-based decision making about 
private sector roles. Furthermore, the efficiency of the 
private sector needs to be studied from the lens of the 
structure of the market (players, their market power and 
vertical restraints), the behaviour in the market and the 
resultant benefits in terms of efficiency and smallholder 
welfare.
Notes
i  Industry data on total fertiliser sales from 1998 
to 2006 as reported in School of Oriental and 
African Studies et al. (2008) are not consistent 
with NSO import data over the same period, and 
are on average around 80,000mt per year higher. 
If this continues from 2007 then commercial sales 
would be around 80,000mt higher than indicated 
in figure 3. It should also be noted that annual 
estimates on sales may not be accurate due to 
carry forward of stocks, but these should average 
out over two or more seasons. 
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